

Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

- 1. Correspondence with individuals, peace societies, and other organizations in foreign countries.
- 2. International exchange of newspaper cuttings, periodicals, and other publications.
- 3. Translation and publication of current literature tending toward the furtherance of the objects of the two societies.
- 4. Furnishing to the press and other publications in Japan and abroad material calculated to remove and to prevent causes of international misunderstanding as well as material of general interest bearing upon the objects of the two societies.
- 5. Arranging interviews of leading representative foreign visitors to Japan with the leaders of thought in this country, so as to bring about a free exchange of views between men of such distinction.
- 6. Enlisting the cooperation of the editors and correspondents of the press by maintaining close touch with them, so that material tending toward the furtherance of the objects of the two societies may appear in the press as much as possible.
- 7. Equipment of a library and reading-rooms for the propagation of current thought on the commercial, legal, racial, moral, religious, and other aspects of international relations.
- 8. Arranging for study groups, conferences, and lectures for the purpose as in Item 7.
- Art. III. The bureau shall be placed under the joint direction and control of a committee composed of an equal number of members appointed by each of the two societies.
- Art. IV. The offices of the bureau shall be located within the offices of the Japan Peace Society.
- Art. V. The following officers shall be appointed for the bureau:
 - 1. One secretary.
 - 2. One typist.
 - 3. One or more assistants.
- Art. VI. Compensation shall be paid to the officers within the following limitations:
- 1. Secretary, not less than fifty yen or more than one hundred yen per month.
 - 2. Typist, about thirty yen per month.
- 3. Assistants to be paid at such scale of salaries as the executive committees of the two societies agree.
- Art. VII. The expenditure of the bureau shall not exceed two thousand four hundred yen per annum.
- The cost of maintenance of the bureau shall be divided into two equal parts, and the two societies shall each contribute a moiety.
- Art. VIII. The following is the budget for the expenditure, subject to the proviso that the transfer of appropriations from one item to another is permitted if approved by the executive committees of the two societies:
 - 1. Office rent not exceeding Y360.00 per annum.
- 2. Remuneration to the secretary not exceeding Y1,200.00 per annum.
- 3. Remuneration to the typist not exceeding Y360.00 per annum.
 - 4. Postage, stationery, and sundries, Y480.00.
- 5. Allowance for assistants to be defrayed out of the balance that may remain, after deducting the estimated items of expenditure from the total income.
 - Art. IX. The terms for which the bureau is estab-

lished is three years. At the expiration of such term the two societies may agree to continue the arrangement for the maintenance of the bureau on the same or similar conditions.

[Mr. Shippen Lewis, of Philadelphia, has already engaged to give \$100 a year for three years to the support of this bureau. Those interested in helping to complete the necessary \$600 may write directly to Dr. Bowles or to this office.—Editors' Note.]

WANTED—AMERICAN PROPAGANDA IN JAPAN

By K. K. KAWAKAMI

Author of "American-Japanese Relations," "Asia at the Door," etc.

A ccording to a Peking dispatch to newspapers, Japan has protested against the improvement of the grand canal of China by the American firm, the Siems-Carey Company, of St. Paul. Personally, I have no more patience with this "dog-in-the-manger" attitude on the part of my native country than I have with the same attitude of Americans toward Japanese enterprise on the Pacific coast, and in Mexico and South America. To our great relief, later dispatches from Tokyo contradict the Peking dispatch, and state that Japan has not yet protested, but is inquiring into the question. It is to be hoped that the protest will never be made.

From a purely legal point of view Japan has, it may be argued, the right to object to this American project, for the German-Chinese convention of 1898, with regard to the Shantung province, contains the following article:

"The Chinese government binds itself, in all cases where foreign assistance, in persons, capital, or material, may be needed for any purpose whatever within the province of Shantung, to offer the said work of supplying of materials in the first instance to German manufacturers and merchants engaged in the undertaking of the kind in question."

Japan may contend that she is, as Germany's successor in the province, entitled to the privilege defined in the article quoted above.

Apart from her legal right, however, Japan will make a grievous mistake in putting her foot upon the American project, which, in my judgment, is purely commercial, unaccompanied with any political ambitions. Moreover, the improvement of the canal is calculated to insure the adjoining country against recurrent inundation, and thus enhance the happiness of a large section of the Chinese population.

At the same time, we can well understand why Japan is inclined to check American enterprise in China. There are two classes of Japanese who look askance at American activities in the Orient.

The first class consists of those who are really fearful of America's aggressive policy in the Far East. They think that America, not content with the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in her own hemisphere, is embarking upon an imperialistic career. She is, they fear, stretching her hands across the Pacific, intent upon extending not only her commercial interests, but her political influence, in China. In Secretary Knox's proposal for the "neutralization" of the Manchurian rail-

ways; in his scheme to construct the Chinchow-Aigun Railway; in the Bethlehem Steel Company's project to establish a dockyard in Fukien, not to mention the American occupation of the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines, the Japanese see ominous rise of the United States in world politics. They think that these American activities, like similar activities of European powers, are not merely commercial, but are attended with political ambitions. They have seen enough of the sinister designs concocted by European powers upon Korea and China, menacing the very existence of their own empire. In their minds, it seems next to impossible to differentiate American enterprise from European. Moreover, American enterprise, backed by unlimited resources and capital, will, they apprehend, sooner or later drive Japanese trade and enterprise in China to the wall, if Japan does not take measures of self-protection against its onslaught. All European investors in China have enjoyed the backing of their respective governments. The railways they have built in China are as much political railways as they are commercial. The concessions they have wrested from Peking also have political meaning. Will not the same unfortunate situation develop from American investments in Chinese railways and canals and mines?

The second class of Japanese who object to American activities in China are those who are not only apprehensive of American "imperialism," but are desirous of showing the Americans what Japan can do in the way of retaliation. Their mood is one of resentment and defiance as well as fear. They have been resenting America's discrimination against the Japanese and her eagerness to forestall any Japanese enterprise, however insignificant and innocent, in Mexico, and even in South America. They have been deeply annoyed by the cry of "Wolf!" raised by publicists at Washington and a large number of American newspapers every time Japan takes a step on the Asian mainland. "Let us show these troublesome, meddling Yankees what we can do to them if they insist upon annoying us all the time with no justification whatever," is the sentiment of these people. The Japanese are but human. You cannot expect them to turn their left cheeks to you after you have slapped them on their right cheeks. They can understand you when you raise an issue over Japanese immigration to your own country, but they do not understand, and will never understand, why on earth you have to pursue them in Mexico and South America, and make so much ado about them, when there is nothing to make a fuss about. You know as well as anybody under the sun that there was no truth in the much-exploited story of the Japanese designs upon Magdalena Bay, and yet one of your foremost publicists introduced a resolution in the Senate at Washington declaring that the United States could not see without grave concern the acquisition of any harbor on the American continent by a foreign corporation "which has such relations to another government, not American, as to give that country practical control for military or naval purposes." Do you expect the Japanese to sit quiet under such an unwarranted rebuff, and let American firms, powerful enough to invoke the assistance of your Government at any necessary moment to protect their investments, do as they please in China? If you do, you are saints, not ordinary human beings, and we common mortals cannot undertake to fathom your mental depth. Your newspapers ever and anon raise the cry of the Japanese peril over insignificant Japanese emigration to Mexico and South America, where the Japanese are welcomed, arguing that, though they are as yet harmless, they may in the future prove a source of trouble, likely to provoke international complications between Japan and some Latin American country, which in turn may embarrass the United States on account of the Monroe Doctrine. If American newspapers and publicists are justified in resorting to such fatuous arguments with regard to the Japanese emigration to Latin-America, may not the Japanese, with equal justification, argue that the inflow of American capital into China may prove the cause of international complications, and therefore must be checked? If we have to trouble ourselves with such childish arguments, we had better destroy steamships, cut off the cables, and return to the happy isolation of the mediæval ages, wherein the nations would have but scant intercourse, each being self-satisfied and self-sufficient. I am sure that President Monroe never dreamed of saying and doing what you are saying and doing about the Japanese today.

This unfortunate state of American-Japanese relations cannot continue much longer if the two countries are to remain friendly, as they certainly must. In the name of international amity and peace, then, I suggest that America institute in Japan a propaganda for mutual understanding, a campaign for enlightenment.

America should send to Japan a man, not a diplomatic official, but a private citizen, not a mediocre man, but a brilliant, versatile, resourceful man, whose view is broad, whose knowledge of American history and of international relations is not superficial. Such a man should explain in speeches and through newspapers and magazines America's real policy and attitude towards China and Japan. He should employ one or two competent Japanese interpreters and translators, and present his views to the Japanese public, not in English, but in Japanese, for in these busy days—for they are busy, even in Japan—no Japanese newspaper or magazine editor would take the trouble to pore over English manuscripts and translate them for publication.

It is strange that this idea has not long since occurred to peace organizations of this country. The Japanese misunderstand America just as much as the Americans misunderstand Japan. And mutual misunderstanding has already brought the two countries to a point where neither is quite sure of permanent peace. The moment is certainly critical, and the public-spirited men on both sides should exercise the utmost influence to preserve what is left of the former cordial relationship between the two nations.

With the question of preparedness uppermost in the minds of the Americans, wild stories about alleged Japanese ambitions have been so freely published in many American newspapers that the Japanese feel almost sure that the American press, in unison with "big interests," are engaged in a conspiracy for discrediting and slandering Japan. I need not recount here how many imaginary sins the Japanese have been accused of committing since the preparedness question became America's foremost issue. Even before the launching of the preparedness propaganda in this country Japan

had long been treated badly enough. As Mr. George Kennan says in the New York Outlook, "Beginning with the San Francisco public-school troubles, the Japanese have been accused of preparing for war with us by buying 750,000 rifles from the Crucible Steel Company (1908); of plotting against us in Hawaii and the Philippines (1909); of excluding Americans from the Manchurian mining field (1909); of discriminating against our commerce by means of transportation rebates on the Manchurian railways (1909); of seeking to monopolize the truck-farming lands in California (1909); of sinking the dry-dock Dewey in Manila Bay (1910); of planting mines in that same bay (1910); of taking soundings and making charts of Californian harbors (1910); of secretly conspiring with Mexico against us (1911); of attempting to secure Magdalena Bay, in Lower California, for a naval base (1911); of secretly taking photographs and making maps on the coasts of Alaska (1911); of trying to get supreme control in Manchuria under pretense of fighting the bubonic plague (1911); of conspiring with Mexican insurgents against us (1912); of persecuting the American missionaries in Korea and trying to abolish Christianity there (1912); of conspiring with Germany to over-throw the Monroe Doctrine (1912); of attacking the American consul in Newchang (1912); of forming an alliance with our west coast Indians against us (1912); of threatening to attack Java, and thus compelling the Dutch to seek our support (1912); of trying to buy Lower California from Huerta (1914); of attempting to get spies into the fortifications of the Panama Canal (1915); of seeking to secure a foothold in Lower California by running a vessel ashore there and sending warships to assist in salvage operations (1916); of conspiring with Germany to get control of the San Blas Indian lands in Panama (1916)."

Add to the list the wild stories of 200,000 Japanese soldiers in Mexico; of Japanese firing at the American troops at Mazatlan; of the Japanese government supplying Mexico with arms and ammunition; of Japan scheming to make Mexico her ally; of Japanese diplomats guiding Carranza's handwriting protests against America's punitive expedition into Mexico; of the Japanese in California urging the Carranza government to declare war upon the United States, and so on and so forth, and you can understand how the Japanese feel about your activities in China and the Philippines. No longer are sensational stories about "Japanese designs" upon America the monopoly of your yellow journals. We who are sincerely desirous of maintaining amicable relations between the two countries are almost dumbfounded by the utterly false charges that have been heaped upon Japan and the Japanese. Scanning the news translated from your daily papers and reading the brief cable dispatches that daily cross the Pacific and find publication in Japanese newspapers, the masses of Japan have almost been led to think that the American Government and people have made up their minds to wage war, an aggressive war, against Japan. Is it your intention to let the situation drift where it may?

If you are going to institute a propaganda in my native country, you must have something definite to tell my countrymen. Peace cannot be maintained by talking peace. If I were you I would go to Japan and talk to the Japanese somewhat like this:

"It is unfortunate that we cannot get along more amicably with you. We can fully appreciate your opposition to our activities in China. But we want you to understand that our enterprise is purely economic, and has no political significance. Our traditional foreign policy forbids our Government to back any enterprise calculated to interfere with the internal administration of any foreign country. True, we have been obliged to assume the control of the Philippines, but that was not because we harbored any territorial ambitions. Our history clearly shows this. As for your activities in Mexico and South America, we shall not hinder them as long as they are economic, just as our activities in China are economic. We deeply regret that some of our publicists and newspapers have made so much fuss about your innocent enterprise in Mexico, and we are frank enough to apologize for it. Our Government and those of our publicists who are well informed understand your intentions, and have no objection to your bona fide enterprise in Latin-America. We regret that the preparedness propaganda has brought in its train sensational stories about your alleged ambitions, both in Mexico and in China, but I hope you will understand that this is only one of the many unfortunate aspects of democracy. We Americans all know that our preparedness program has been adopted not for any aggressive purpose or with an eye upon any particular foreign nation, but in a democracy like ours we cannot move the huge, unwieldly mass of people into action unless we convince them of the necessity of immediate action by concrete examples. That is why you have been unfortunate enough to be picked out and exploited as one of our possible enemies. We also deeply regret that your countrymen in California have been discriminated against by laws of the State. We wish that the situation could be immediately remedied by extending citizenship to your countrymen in our country. But here again we have to encounter the difficulties of democracy. Our Government and many of our publicists have no objection to granting citizenship to the Japanese, and we trust that steps toward that end will be taken at an opportune moment. We appreciate your hearty cooperation in restricting the emigration of your laborers to our country. At the same time we realize your resentment of our discriminatory measures against Japanese immigration, but these measures are necessitated by economic reasons, not racial. We earnestly hope that the time may come when the economic standards of your working class will be so elevated as to obviate the necessity of such discriminatory measures on our part. The solution of such questions requires much time, and both you and we must be patient. In the meantime you may rest assured that we shall do all in our power to remove the cause of irritation between the two countries, and we trust you will not hesitate to cooperate with us, as you so loyally have in the past.'

This, in fact, is what we, who have access to Japanese newspapers, have been telling our compatriots in Japan. Are not Americans ready to join us and speak to the Japanese with sincerity, sympathy, frankness, and in a conciliatory spirit? Is not America willing to send to Japan some such definite message as I have suggested? The message, to be effective, must be repeated, propounded, and driven home to the Japanese public. It will not do to throw it into thin air and leave it to the

mercy of the winds. The task is imperative. Unless public-spirited Americans address themselves to it with earnestness, the relations between the two countries will be fraught with dangers which no preparedness program, however gigantic, will succeed in removing. There are blatant, bigoted Japanese who would not listen to sane reasoning of Americans, just as there are blatant, bigoted Americans whose eyes are closed and whose ears are sealed against light and information. In the final decision of great issues, however, such men do not count for much. The majority of the Japanese people will certainly welcome your sympathetic, sincere efforts for enlightenment, just as the majority of the American people welcome the sincere efforts of the Japanese for the promotion of mutual understanding.

JAPAN AND THE U.S. NAVAL PROGRAM

The following discriminating and altogether significant expression of Japanese views is taken from The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo, of August 30, 1916.—The Editors.

The voting of an impressive naval program with impressive unanimity by both houses of the United States legislature was intently noted by the Japanese press, but there has been a rather striking absence of comment. Japan's interest in the navy of her Pacific neighbor is obvious, and the effect which the recent appropriations will have on the Pacific situation would have formed a very natural subject for discussion. No harm, but the reverse, can come from frank and friendly discussion of international questions, and it was with some regret that we observed the silence of the daily papers on a question in which they showed their interest by the cabled reports they published. The absence of comment in the daily press is not compensated by the expectation that some calm and considered thinking will be found in the monthly reviews, for it seems to be another example of the topsy-turvydom of the East that the monthly magazines provide the circus in which the political "wild men" perform their most astonishing feats of ground and lofty tumbling. If the explanation were offered that the Japanese newspapers refrained from discussing the American naval appropriations for the reason that these are none of their business, we should reply that the daily papers have not previously adopted the ostrich-like policy of silence on any matter of foreign affairs which interested them, and no reasonable person expects that they will. As a matter of fact, the American naval program is of unquestionable importance to Japan. The two papers which form the only exceptions to the rule are the Chugai Shogyo, which, like commercial organs the world over, is generally moderate and reasonable in its views, and the Kokumin, which is best known by its brilliant editor's expositions of nationalistic and chauvinistic ideas. By a somewhat obvious coincidence both share the first impression that it will be impossible for Japan to compete in naval construction with the boundless resources of the United States. The Chugai Shogyo, in view of this fact, urges that a convention should be concluded with the United States, as with Russia, in order to settle the relations of the two countries. The Kokumin believes that the Japanese reply should be an increased naval program. "Safety first," says the Chugai Shogyo, is

the idea behind the acceleration of American ship building, and the necessity of making the Pacific fleet as powerful for its possible duties as the Atlantic fleet, irrespective of the mobility (still an uncertain quantity) conferred by the Panama Canal. The paper admits that Japanese naval expansion has had something to do with American anxiety, and fears that if the two nations enter on an armament race a situation may develop similar to that which grew up between England and Germany. To avoid a rivalry which would be dangerous for both countries, and would place Japan, with her limited resources, in an impossible position, the Chugai Shogyo urges Japan to move towards a Japanese-American convention to secure the peace of this part of the world. Mr. Tokutomi takes the only course open to a man who believes, as he does, that America is an aggressive, or at least not a peaceful, nation, and that her naval increase is mainly due to the fact that "the hearts of Americans are filled with the Pacific problem." He alleges that her naval preparations have been directed towards a "distant enemy," which he seems to think shows them to be offensive and not defensive, and, though exonerating Americans of any present intention to attack Japan, he fears the chances of the future. If America comes out with a "big stick" in her fist while we are empty-handed, we cannot trust to magnanimity alone. We readily add that Mr. Tokutomi writes without animus, and we take no exception to his frankly describing the situation as he sees it.

Our point is that he does not see the whole of it. How any man with a knowledge of history can regard the United States as an aggressive nation passes our comprehension. There is a kind of quibbling logic which "proves" American aggressiveness by citing the expansion of the original thirteen States into the sea-to-sea Republic of today, but it is a string of mere debating points, destitute of realities, and convincing no one. The natural growth of a people settled in an unoccupied continent, building new cities and new States as it overflows and develops the land, is not aggression. Americans suffer from no drang nach—anywhere. They have no unredeemed territory to liberate like Italy, no outlet to open sea to lure them on like Russia, no dynastic tradition of expansion by force like Prussia, no scattered empire of 300 years' growth like England, with unsolved problems cropping up along its boundaries and lines of communication. The home territory of America will not be completely exploited for generations to come. What is more, their home territory offers Americans better opportunities than any other, and the root source of national expansion to other lands is thus completely absent. The American farmer occasionally shakes the dust of an unprofitable proposition off his feet and goes to Canada, where there is plenty of room and a friendly reception for him. The American artisan never has to look for a home in a more prosperous land than his own. The whole tendency of America is centripetal and not centrifugal. It is an indrawing, not an overflowing, nation. America absorbs, and will continue to absorb for an indefinite time to come, the force which drives crowded countries to talk of "places in the sun." This fact removes the greatest and perhaps the only valid cause for fearing aggression by a nation.